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Ms. Ref. No.: ECMODE-D-16-00482R1 
Title: The Hidden Soul of Financial Innovation: an Agent-Based Modelling of Home Mortgage 
Securitization and the Finance-Growth Nexus. 
 
Summary of the main changes to the paper 
I thank the Editor and both Referees for their second review, which has helped transform and improve 
the paper further. 
To the Editor 
1. Regarding the contribution, in line with the point raised by Referee 2 (see point 1, p. 3), 
the Editor believes that the paper is focused on the already well-known topic investigated 
in the literature, which argues that excessive innovation is bad for the finance-growth 
nexus and that too much financial innovation created the crisis.  
I thank the editor and Referee 2 for their comments on this point, and wish to clarify the novelty of the 
paper with respect to previous studies on this topic. 
First, the paper makes a clear distinction between the concept of financial innovation and the introduced 
concept of rate of financial innovation (RoFIN). RoFIN, as explained in the paper (see pp. 3, 9-10 and 
the revised version of the abstract) captures financial agents’ business decision on how to use financial 
innovation tools, processes and services (speculative or non-speculative). RoFIN behaves as an 
endogenous variable of financial innovation. This distinction is based on the assumption that financial 
innovation on its own cannot be blamed for generating financial instability and eventually financial crisis. 
“Innovation” in principle is a positive development, which promotes progress in the economic system. 
However, progress (or innovation) can be disruptive (see Disruptive Innovation Theory, Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003. For an excellent review, see Yu and Hang, 2010); in particular, if there are rapid diffusion 
and adoption of the innovation (Sinkey, 1992). According to Mullineux (2010) and Roger (2003), 
widespread adoption – the relative speed with which an innovation is adopted by the agents of the system 
- exploits “network effects,” encouraging the underpricing of risks in order to gain “first mover” 
advantage and to increase profits.  Rogers (2003) explains that some aspects of the diffusion of 
innovation have a systemic nature, hence the analysis cannot be limited only to the study of the individual 
behaviour of agents. More specifically, with regard to the financial system, Mullineux (2010) argues that 
rapid and widespread adoption of financial innovation is promoted to generate higher profits in the 
financial industry. As a result, this generates a tendency to underprice risks. In fact, securitization (which 
is analysed in this paper) on its own cannot be necessarily defined as a disruptive innovation. However, 
securitization combined with asset underpricing (in other words, the business model applied and its 
evolution; for example, the Subprime or Junk Bond markets) creates financial instability with an ensuing 
impact on the real economy. Therefore, the business decisions (and their development over time) of the 
financial agents operating in the financial system are crucial. These business decisions lead the level of 
development of the financial innovation tools, processes and services within the financial system. They 
govern the speed at which financial innovation spreads through the market and starts to be adopted 
widely by each level of financial operators. The wider the adoption and diffusion of financial innovation 
from the high end to the low end of the market, the higher the risk of underpricing assets. Hence, this can 
result in disruptive innovation, leading to destabilising effects on the financial and economic systems.  
*Response to Reviewers
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More specifically, the model presents a non-fixed securitization ratio at the bank level which changes over 
time and there exists a ‘max securitization ratio’ which represents the financial system’s maximum 
capacity to securitize assets (see sections 4 and 5 of the revised paper ). However, what governs the 
dynamics and changes the securitization ratio here, as well as loosening the credit standards mirrored by 
the variable Beta (see section 4, p.10 ), is the RoFIN and not just the securitization (so the financial 
innovation in itself). 
The main contribution of the paper is that it can clearly show something more interesting and relevant for 
policy purposes: the RoFIN threshold level. According to the simulation results, when RoFIN exceeds 
the level of 50% it begins to make financial innovation become harmful for the economy. However, the 
model can also show that with a RoFIN level of under 50% (in the ABM exercise, 40%), financial 
innovation actually has a positive impact on the economy and promotes growth. When RoFIN reaches 
90% (with a beta of 0.45) the ABM model is able to reproduce dynamics close to those observed before 
and during the financial crisis (see previous ‘response to comments’, Referee 2, point 5, p.5 for the 
explanation regarding the choice of the numbers of RoFIN in order to compute Beta).  
 
2. The Editor asks whether I can show in the paper a clear threshold level of financial 
innovation beyond which it would be harmful for growth. If yes, he suggests highlighting 
it in the abstract and in the highlights.  
Following the explanation provided at point 1, the abstract and highlights have been revised.  
 
3. The Editor invites me to make sure that the paper is error-free in the next version.  
The paper has been double checked with the proofreader, and it is now error-free. 
 
To Referee 1(#2) 
1. The Referee feels that it may be better to introduce a formal model part with a strong 
mathematical flavour to explain the securitization asset clearing process in the whole 
economy. Therefore, he suggests inserting a formal introduction to the ICEACE model 
in the paper. 
 
An introduction to the original version of the ICEACE model has been provided in Appendix 1. The 
main text refers to this appendix at the beginning of Section 2, p. 6. There are two reasons why I chose to 
insert the introduction to ICEACE as an appendix: 1) to avoid increasing the length of the main text; and 
2) to keep the reader focused on the incremental exercise, as explained in Section 2, p. 6. 
 
2. The Referee believes that the monetary environment in the model does not change 
because of the presence of a fund with fixed liquidity. He asks the author to defend this 
point very well and suggests doing more computational exercises with variable funds. 
 
I apologise to the Referee because I did not specify an important aspect in my previous ‘response to 
comments’ to the point raised here. The Fund for modelling purposes is simply initialized as a fixed 
exogenously given liquidity when the fund initial balance sheet is set up (see code in Appendix 4 - III, IV, 
V- pp. 41-42). Moreover, the model assumes that the fund is liquid in the condition of normality. 
However, this does not mean that the liquidity available in the Fund does not change over time. As 
explained in my previous ‘response to comments’, in the model a securitization target for the financial 
 3 
 
system operates, which is adjusted to the fund liquidity available at each point in time. In fact, the model 
considers the case that securitization demand can be rationed because of lack of liquidity in the Fund (for 
a more extensive explanation, see the previous ‘response to comments’, Referee 2, point 4, p. 4 and the 
revised version of the paper, section 5, p. 11-12). 
 
With regard to the definition of the monetary environment in the model, I assume that the monetary 
channel transmission is governed by the Central Bank (one of the agents of the ABM model; see 
Appendix 1, p. 34). The Central Bank has two main roles in the model. First, it sets the interest rate 
according to a Taylor rule, taking into account both unemployment and the rate of inflation (this implies 
that banks set mortgage rates based on the CB interest rate). Second, the Central Bank acts as a liquidity 
provider for the banking sector (this also implies that CB liquidity is always more costly compared to the 
liquidity obtained from the Fund through the securitization process). 
 
Finally, in previous experiments, I did the exercise suggested by the Referee, and incresed the level of 
liquidity of the Fund balance sheet initialization, which proved to be irrelevant for the overall outcomes 
of the simulations. Reducing the initialised liquidity of the fund below the capacity of the financial system 
does not make sense, on the assumption that the fund in the condition of normality is always liquid. 
 
 
 
 
To Referee 2(#3) 
 
 
1. The Referee, as well as the Editor, is concerned about the contribution. He feels that the 
contribution is small and suggests shortening the length of the paper and presenting the 
results of the ABM exercise conducted in a simple and concise manner.  
 
See the explanation provided above to the Editor about the contribution (point 1, p. 1). The request of 
the second Referee to shorten the paper further conflicts with the request of the first Referee and Editor 
to add explanations, which I have done in the attached revised paper. The main changes are listed in the 
covering letter. 
Finally, I took into account the references provided by Referee 2, whom I thank, because these helped me 
to improve the literature review (see Introduction, p. 2). 
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Highlights 
1. The paper introduces the rate of financial innovation (RoFIN) as an endogenous variable of 
financial innovation.  
2. RoFIN captures the financial agents’ business decisions on how to use financial innovation tools, 
processes and services. 
3. An Agent-Based modelling approach is applied to study the interaction between RoFIN and the 
mortgage securitization process. 
4. The study postulates the existence of two business cycle scenarios: virtuous and unvirtuous. 
5. The numerical simulation shows that a threshold of between 50% and 90% makes financial 
innovation become harmful for economic growth. 
6. RoFIN is of interest for financial regulation and supervision. 
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The Hidden Soul of Financial Innovation: an Agent-Based Modelling of Home 
Mortgage Securitization and the Finance-Growth Nexus 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the interaction between financial innovation and securitization. To this 
end, it introduces the rate of financial innovation (RoFIN) as an endogenous variable in an 
Agent-Based Model (ABM) set up and studies its interaction with the non-fixed fraction of 
securitized mortgage loans. RoFIN is able to capture financial agents’ business decisions on 
using financial innovation tools, processes and services, such as the home mortgage 
securitization process. In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial and economic crisis it has 
been argued that financial innovation and securitization have increased macro/finance systemic 
instability via, for example, non-linear two-way spillovers between the financial system and the 
macroeconomy. The ABM model proposed enables the capture of these dynamics. High values 
of RoFIN (i.e. exceeding the threshold of 50%) make financial innovation become harmful for 
the economic system, leading to a switch from a virtuous to an unvirtuous business cycle. When 
RoFIN reaches 90%, the numerical simulations come close to the macro/finance dynamics 
observed before and during the financial crisis. Given its potential role in triggering financial 
and economic instability, RoFIN is of interest for financial regulation and supervision. How this 
endogenous variable may be influenced by means of operational variables under the control of 
policymakers remains a subject for future research. 
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1 Introduction 
The need to understand the finance-growth nexus and the role of financial innovation within it, in 
particular with regard to the process of endogenous money/credit creation, has led to this research 
paper. The modern financial system is complex, globalized and highly technologically advanced, 
characterized by financial innovation and speculation (Bezemer, 2012; Nguyen, 2014). Econometric 
*Manuscript WITHOUT Author Identifiers.
Click here to view linked References
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papers such as those by Amore et al. (2013) or Beck et al. (2016) show that there exists a strong 
connection between finance and technological innovation. Studies focusing on understanding the U.S. 
subprime mortgage crisis, such as those of Mian and Sufi (2009), Keys et al. (2010) and Dell’Aricchia 
et al. (2012), have found evidence of the linkage between the securitization process and lax lending 
standards.  Mallick and Sousa (2013) show how changes in financial distress conditions can explain 
output fluctuations. Others have clearly highlighted the existence of the finance-growth nexus (e.g. 
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 
2005; Greenwood et al., 2010; Creel et al., 2015) and demonstrated that financial innovation 
combined with deregulation has on one hand fostered a rapid development of the financial system, but 
on the other has increased financial instability and complexity over time (e.g. Brunnermeier and 
Sannikov, 2014; Grydaky and Bezemer, 2013; Bezemer, 2012; Dosi et al., 2013;  Palley, 2011). This 
has contributed to a shift from the OTH (Originate-To-Hold)
1
 model to the OTD (Originate-To-
Distribute)
2
 model (Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Bord and Santos, 2012; Scannella, 2011). The latter, 
characterized by the use of financial innovation instruments and trading strategies to promote credit 
risk transfer, triggers the creation of multi-leveraging phenomena within the financial sector. In 
principle, the OTD model helps to improve the diversification of risk. According to Allen and Carletti 
(2006), this is true only if the demand for liquidity is uniform. Otherwise, when there are idiosyncratic 
liquidity risk and hedging behaviours, credit risk transfer (and multi-leveraging) can become harmful 
to the economy. However, the empirical studies conducted to explain and understand the last financial 
crisis and the nexus between finance and growth mostly identify financial innovation with the 
securitization process, when in fact the concept of financial innovation is much more extensive.  
There are few theoretical and empirical studies specifically focused on the broader concept of 
financial innovation (e.g. see Rousseau, 1998; Levine, 1997, 2005; Klein and Olivei, 2008; Lerner 
and Tufano, 2011). However, these studies define and model financial innovation in a way that 
overlaps with the concept of innovation used in the manufacturing sector. They focus their attention 
on a more generic and not very well identified concept of financial innovation, analysing its impact on 
financial depth and its resulting effects on economic growth. Therefore, the role of financial 
innovation still remains unclear and not well modelled. 
The paper contributes to the ongoing discussion in the literature on financial innovation.  In particular, 
it applies the concepts of ‘disruptive innovation’ (Christensen and Raynor, 2003) and ‘diffusion and 
                                                          
1 The Originate-To-Hold (OTH) model is based on traditional bank business - collecting savings to make loans. 
2 The Originate-To-Distribute (OTD) model is the newly established financial system architecture. The OTD model makes it possible to 
split some activities in the value chain of mortgage and loan supply. Each financial agent can transfer risk forward to other financial agents 
along the chain. 
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adoption of innovation’ (Sinkey, 1992; Rogers, 2003)3. Therefore, from this perspective, the paper 
defines financial innovation as the interaction between securitization and the more specific concept of 
the rate of financial innovation. This concept captures the level of development of financial tools, 
processes and services, given the financial operators’ business decisions on how to make use of them 
(in terms of operational business decisions
4
). Is there any role played by financial innovation 
(securitization times the rate of financial innovation) in affecting endogenous money/credit creation? 
If there is, how does it impact on the finance-growth nexus? 
It would appear that the link between securitization and the rate of financial innovation has yet to be 
investigated in the literature. The interesting paper of Leaven et al. (2015) investigates for the first 
time the coevolution of the interaction between finance and technology and introduces the concept of 
financial innovation as the ‘rate of financial system improvements’ in the Schumpeterian economic 
growth model. However, the authors are focused on analysing how the interaction between finance 
and technology affects the financial system screening process to fund entrepreneurs. They do not 
model the role of the financial system in diversifying risk and they do not provide any discussion on 
how exceeding certain levels of diversification (i.e. the rate of financial system improvements) can 
lead to asset mispricing and increasing systemic instability, which were the conditions at the heart of 
the last global financial crisis.  
Additionally, this research assumes the existence of two temporally opposite cycles; namely, the 
virtuous and unvirtuous cycles. The virtuous cycle characterized the post-world war II period, an era 
of rapid progress (the golden age). Until the 1970s/80s, the economy had modest inflation rates, low 
unemployment rates, and rapid economic growth. In the virtuous cycle the presence of a developed 
structure of financial institutions channels high levels of savings into the productive sector, spurs 
investments for innovation projects in the economy and fosters a high level of economic growth.  
However, the technological revolution in the 1970s/80s promoted the creation of an “IT network 
economy”, making the financial system a complex environment. The will of the financial and 
economic operators to diversify risk by complex financial integration of the economy was 
accompanied by an increasing level of indebtedness in the economy and the risk of associated 
emerging externalities, marking the passage from a period of prudential attitude, when debt use was 
careful, to a period of prosperity, when the debt exposure of all the agents operating in the economic 
system grew rapidly (Minsky, 1986). Therefore, the alternative perspective seems to entail an 
unvirtuous cycle, in which the growth-finance relationship is reversed into the finance-growth nexus. 
Part of the wealth created in the business cycle is captured and, thanks to the presence of sophisticated 
                                                          
3
 Innovation can be disruptive; in particular, when there is a rapid diffusion and adoption of it. A widespread adoption – the relative speed 
with which an innovation is adopted by the agents of the system - exploits ‘networks effects’, encouraging underpricing of risks in order to 
gain ‘first mover’ advantage and increase profits (Mullineux, 2010). 
4 Operational business decisions are a collection of business rules which help to automate operational choices, such as the number of 
mortgages to send to the securitization process. 
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financial innovation tools, it is not allocated to the productive sector, but diverted into speculative 
channels for the financial operators’ self-seeking profit interests. This bad cycle has supported the 
reinforcement of monopolistic financial positions (financial power concentration), which had already 
started in the virtuous cycle as a natural consequence (externality) of the development from a period 
of prudential attitude to a period of prosperity (Minsky, 1986).  It has resulted in a financial market 
and political power in the hands of the financial sector. This strengthens the possibility that 
increasingly aggressive ‘boom and bust cycles’ are created over time, with wider gaps with respect to 
potential GDP, and a reduction in the length of time between the occurrence of one boom-bust and 
another.
5
 The increasing level of volatility created in the business cycle makes the economy more 
fragile, raising the possibility of turning easily from simple financial/real shock to severe economic 
crises. As a consequence, business and innovation investments slow down, and the level of growth 
declines until, in the worst case scenario, there is a recession and negative growth (as was observed 
after the 2007-2009 financial crisis). Regulatory loopholes emerge, and current regulation becomes 
inadequate. Thus, a crisis forces re-regulation and a switch to a virtuous cycle for a certain period. 
However, when the financial capitalists exert new pressures for liberalization (as the length of time 
since the last crisis increases), the virtuous cycle gradually tends to turn bad again, as the political 
influence of financial capitalists and regulation laxity increases, until the next crisis erupts. Hence, 
more regulatory tightening will be applied, and so on. A ‘regulatory dialectic’ (Kane, 1977) seems to 
underpin the passage from one cycle to another. 
 
Regarding the choice of methodology, this study takes into account the fact that after the global 
financial crisis a wide debate in the literature has questioned the reliability of the dominant paradigm 
in macroeconomics. Several studies have revealed the inadequacy of the mainstream macroeconomic 
models and the difficulties these models have encountered in proposing adequate policy solutions 
(e.g. see Colander et al., 2008; Kirman, 2010; Keen, 2011; Bezemer, 2011; Romer, 2016 - 
forthcoming). However, it is interesting to observe that, although in the literature there is a wide 
debate on, and relevant evidence for, the non-neutral and non-exogenous role of the financial system 
within the economy, the leading monetary policy analysis approach is still founded on the general 
equilibrium models (based on the General Equilibrium Theory - (Walras, 1874, 1877)), and the 
resulting complex DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) models
6
 developed are still 
widely used by monetary authorities and governments to decide policy strategies and actions. These 
models and related assumptions (e.g. representative independent agents, full rationality and full 
information, perfect markets, etc.), provide impressive mathematical toolkits, but present artefact 
                                                          
5 ... as some of the literature has also highlighted (e.g. Koo, 2014). 
6
The DSGE models, developed by a new generation of economists such as E.S. Phelps, R. Lucas, N. G. Mankiw and others, are micro-
founded general equilibrium representative agent models, able to capture non-linear dynamics. They bring together the neoclassical (Real 
Business Cycles) and the New Keynesian models.  
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elements with no clear link to reality (Verspagen, 2004), distorting the correct interpretation of 
phenomena such as the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and constraining the identification of the problem 
and its solution (Tovar, 2009). In particular, for these models the banking sector and credit creation 
and debt are a marginal exogenous problem that can only create temporary shocks which cannot affect 
the long-run macroeconomic dynamics. Moreover, the more sophisticated form of these models, 
represented by the DSGE models, do not produce appreciable results on capturing emergent 
phenomena and in modelling financial system behaviour. 
 
Since the crisis, mainstream macroeconomists have tried to compensate for the lack of realism in their 
models by introducing a more detailed theoretical specification of the micro-economic foundations; in 
particular, with regard to the heterogeneity of the agents and financial system interactions with the 
economy. An interesting example is the work of Jakab and Kumhof (2015), which introduces the 
mechanism of banks financing themselves through money creation. However, this remains limited to 
the ‘credit multiplier’ concept at the commercial bank level, without incorporating any mechanism of 
securitization processes or financial innovation, and without integrating any other kind of leverage 
amplification mechanism.  
 
Interest in alternative and multidisciplinary approaches has risen drastically over the last decade, as 
the ESRC has also highlighted in its recent call for proposals “Understanding the Macroeconomics 
Network Plus.” Among the alternatives, Agent-Based methodology, applied to the analysis of 
macroeconomic dynamics, has emerged as an interesting modelling approach (Tesfatsion and Judd, 
2006 ; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008). ABM models consist of dynamically interacting rule-based 
agents. The system within which they interact can create real-world-like complexity. One of the 
important aspects of using ABM is that one is more focused on the robustness of the model in order to 
capture complexity and the emergence of phenomena, rather than being simply focussed on the steady 
state. Emergent phenomena cannot be understood by analysing the single parts of the system 
separately and then adding them up. In fact, emergent phenomena are often counterintuitive, given the 
nonlinear reactions to small changes in the system parameters. An ABM can or cannot generate 
equilibriums. However, this is not assumed ex-ante but arises as a result of the tangled agents’ 
interactions computed by the model. The agent-based modelling approach seems to be a “better 
financial crisis predictor” (Bezemer, 2012), flexible and able to model financial and economic 
dynamics as non-deterministic and stochastic phenomena. In addition, heterogeneous agents with 
cognitive and adaptive capabilities are considered and characterised by non-Markovian behaviours 
(Bezemer, 2012). ABM can help to overcome the methodological limitations of the neoclassical-
based macroeconomic models in shaping the new reality of the financial system characterized by 
complexity, heterogeneous and diversified agents, adaptive profit-seeking strategies, financial 
innovation, moral hazard and regulatory arbitrage.  
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The paper shows, through an Agent-Based Exercise (ABE), that the economy's financial instability 
resides mainly in the financial structure, where financial innovation plays a relevant role. The 
experiment shows clear evidence for the existence of the unvirtuous cycle and sheds light on the 
switching mechanism from the virtuous to the unvirtuous cycle led by the increasing rate of financial 
innovation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 to 6 present the ABE, explaining how 
the experiment was implemented and presenting an analysis of the outcomes and the relative statistics. 
Section 7 provides some policy implications, indicating the direction for future research and the 
conclusions. 
 
2 The ABM Exercise 
The ICEACE (Erlingsson et al., 2014) Agent-Based model (ABM) has been chosen to conduct the 
ABE. ICEACE
7
 is an open source ABM (http://iceace.github.io/home/) and is an excellent base for 
use in the present research study. ICEACE contains the main real and some of the financial variables 
that were at the heart of the 2007-2009 subprime crisis. In addition, the ICEACE ABM uses the stock-
flow balance-sheet approach, which is a methodology introduced in ABM to test the consistency of 
the model, checking its solidity and economically sound foundation (Teglio et al., 2010).  
 
An incremental modification of the main code has been made (see Appendix 4), inserting the core of 
what generates the unvirtuous cycle to test its existence (i.e. the securitization process and rate of 
financial innovation). It is not the intention of this paper to provide a review of the entire ICEACE 
model; instead, the paper is centered on its incremental implementation. For this reason, there follows 
here and in section 3 a summary of the main conceptual aspects and technical elements of the model 
that are needed to understand the ABE. However, a brief introduction to the original model setup is 
available in Appendix 1 (see also Appendices 2 and 3 for initial values and parameters). For a more 
extended and detailed explanation of the ICEACE modelling framework and its underlying 
mechanism it is recommended to refer to Erlingsson et al.’s (2014) paper.  
 
There are other macro ABM models, such as those of Cincotti et al. (2010, 2012) and Raberto et al., 
(2012), both EURACE models, and of Dosi et al. (2015) and Riccetti et al., (2016), which consider 
heterogeneous commercial banks and investigate the evolutionary dynamics of the link between real 
variables and credit provision. However, these macroeconomic models are more focused on the real 
                                                          
7 The name ICEACE denotes Agent-Based Computational Economics for Iceland, founded by the Icelandic Centre for 
Research. 
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side of the economy and related shocks, concentrating marginal attention to an analysis of the 
financial aspects, in which financial shocks remain described as exogenous phenomena. ICEACE, 
instead, is mainly focused on the effects of the presence in the economy of the housing market and its 
central role in business cycles when mortgage defaults are manifested. Households usually apply for 
mortgages from banks to buy a house. If they cannot repay the debt, banks’ balance sheets suffer a 
shock on the asset side. In particular, in the presence of outstanding shocks, the reduction in the level 
of granting of credits inevitably affects the real economy. The ICEACE model, as its authors explain, 
investigates “.... the financial aspects of the market, such as housing prices, mortgage payments, 
household debt, the fragility of the banking sector and the effect on the real economy through the 
wealth effect of housing and the credit market” (Erlingsson et al., 2014, p.4). However, in the 
ICEACE model there is no focus on the established OTD (Originate-To-Distribute) model of the 
financial system, in which financial agents are not only represented by banks. Adding the role of the 
rate of financial innovation and the securitization process into the model improves the ability of the 
financial sector to diversify risk (impacting on the banks’ capital adequacy ratio and mispricing 
assets). As a consequence, given the reduced perception of risk and uncertainty, the financial sector 
eases regulation constraints and concentrates power in its hands, increasing its monopolistic positions 
and interfering with political power (financial market abuse). Financial market power and political 
power become tightly linked, boosting self-gain interests and triggering a conflict between public and 
private interest. Erlingsson et al. (2014, p. 24) claim that “...the volatility of GDP increases when a 
higher amount of credit money is allowed to enter in the economic system” and “the more you lend, 
the more you grow”; this is true and in line with the perspective of this paper. However, they have 
based their analysis on a beta value (representing the budget constraint) that sets banks' behaviour 
when they evaluate household capability to repay a mortgage loan before granting it. A lower beta 
means that the banks are careful when granting a mortgage; on the other hand, a higher beta means 
they grant mortgages loans more easily, even if the borrowers are riskier. They show how more 
permissive financial system (represented only by commercial banks) behaviour initially spurs a higher 
GDP growth rate and subsequently drags the economic system into deep recessions. They assume that 
beyond this behaviour there is a policy incentive (defined by Stiglitz, 2010, p.388 as “unbridled 
liberalization”), as that makes the financial system willing to increase the level of mortgages. Of 
course, accommodating policies play an important role in this scheme, but from another perspective 
that is not considered by Erlingsson et al. (2014). A more permissive policy has led to the easier 
promotion of the diffusion of the financial innovation tools, processes and services, facilitating access 
to new financial instruments and products. This has contributed to a shift from the OTH to the OTD 
model, as explained in the introduction, fostering the use (or abuse) of a higher beta and then 
increasing mortgage (and loan) lending. However, financial regulations in favour of the financial 
system without a technologically advanced financial transformation would not have instigated any 
change in the behaviour of banks in terms of creditworthiness conditions (or it would be very partial 
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and not relevant). What has made the difference is the increasing level of resort to financial 
innovation (in terms of the securitization process and rate of financial innovation) and the building up 
in the last two decades of what we call the technologically advanced financial sector. Therefore, this 
paper sheds light on why banks decided to change their attitude towards borrowers and what the key 
element is that makes them more willing to grant mortgages more easily to any risk-typology of 
borrowers; this key element is indeed the rate of financial innovation. 
 
3 Agents and timing  
The ICEACE modified version (see Erlingsson et al., 2014 for the original version)  presents an 
economy constituted by households (HHs), firms (Fs), construction firms (CFs),
8
  banks (Bs), a 
capital fund (EF), a special purpose vehicle (SPV), the government (G), and a central bank (CB). The 
day is the basic time step of the simulation. All the events are pooled on weekly, monthly or quarterly 
sequences, and they are simultaneous. Commercial banks supply loans to Fs and CFs and provide real 
estate mortgages to HHs. Bs collect private sector deposits from HHs, Fs, and CFs and may borrow 
from the CB if they have a shortage of liquidity. There is information asymmetry. Lending activity by 
Bs is constrained by a minimum capital requirement (Basel rules). Regarding the equity of the 
borrower, Fs and CFs must have positive equity to receive a loan, while HHs must fulfil a minimum 
equity ratio requirement (i.e. net wealth must be ≤ than a fraction φ of the total wealth9 - see Appendix 
1 for more details). 
 
In the original version of the ICEACE model, neither investment banks nor financial innovation is 
examined. Therefore, the new version of ICEACE considers the Universal Bank Model, assuming that 
Bs play the dual role of commercial and investment banks. The commercial banks, through the SPV, 
operate the securitization of mortgages, pooling and packaging them into CMO (Collateralized 
Mortgages Obligation) derivatives. In ICEACE, Fs employ labour and homogeneous capital goods to 
produce homogeneous consumption goods (K and L are constant over time). The Fs are characterised 
by Leontief production technology. Unit production costs are the ratio between labour costs plus the 
debts costs for Fs to banks and previous production. Prices are set with a fixed mark-up on the 
average unit production costs. Based on their production plans, Fs will form their labour demand and 
base their expected sales on previous production. Fs are ‘profit oriented’ (profit maximization). No 
innovation or imitation investments are considered. The CFs employ labour and homogeneous capital 
goods to produce new homogeneous housing units. The HHs provide a homogeneous labour force to 
Fs and CFs, buy homogeneous consumption goods from Fs and new houses built by CFs and 
                                                          
8 In ICEACE, firms employ labour and homogeneous capital goods to produce consumption goods, whereas construction 
firms employ labour and homogeneous capital goods to produce new homogeneous housing units. 
9
 Total wealth is the sum of housing wealth, liquid wealth, and capital fund share wealth (see Erlingsson et al., 2014, p.14). 
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exchange with each other their stock of housing units. The labour market is decentralised and the 
turnover phase is random. The G collects taxes on both labour and capital income, and pays 
unemployment benefits to HHs. The CB fixes the interest rate, sets the policy of standing facilities 
and provides loans to the G if needed. The EF accepts the equity shares of Fs, CFs and Bs and collects 
the dividends; it may also provide liquidity to Fs and CFs. EF shares are equally distributed among 
HHs. For the ABE, the EF purchases the financial products issued by the commercial 
banks/investment banks, providing fresh liquidity that is used by the Bs to grant new mortgages. 
 
4 How securitization and the rate of financial innovation are implemented in 
ICEACE  
The ICEACE model shows the balance sheets of the main economic agents present in an economy. 
The initialisation of the balance sheet of economic agents and other initial variables are drawn with 
limited degrees of freedom, setting initial conditions and parameters based on statistical data,
10
 
common knowledge, literature, assumptions designed to be consistent with a realistic economy, and 
best-guess estimates and conventions when working with agent-based models. Calibration is not the 
aim of the exercise. For a detailed explanation of the set of initial values and parameters of the 
simulation setting, refer to Erlingsson et al.'s (2014) paper
11
 (see also appendices 2 and 3 of this paper 
for the implemented list of the general parameters and initial values used in the model). Once the 
balance sheet for each agent is initialised, the stock-flow balance sheet construction becomes the main 
tool for building the other components of the model. In particular, attention is focused here on the 
banks’ balance sheet when the incremental ABE is made. The sum of the liquidity of firms, including 
construction firms, and the liquidity of households (which also incorporates mortgages taken out) are 
also the deposits of banks. Bank assets incorporate debts by all types of firms, mortgages granted to 
households and the banks' own liquidity, which is set as a ratio of the total assets. Other parameters 
such as ‘mortgage duration’ (40 years) and ‘capital adequacy ratio’ (0.05) are established according to 
Erlingsson et al. (2014) and the general literature to which they relate (i.e. Carrol et al., 2011 and 
Case, 2005). The ‘initial capital adequacy ratio’ for the single bank balance sheet initialization 
        is the parameter used to establish the equity level. Bank debts to the central bank are used 
to equilibrate the banks’ balance sheet, whose difference, at the end of each year, needs to be equal to 
0. The added incremental parameters are the ‘financial system’s max securitization ratio’ (MAXδ), 
which is established at the value of [0.5] and the ‘rate of financial innovation’ (RoFIN), which is 
established at the values of [0.4, 0.5 and 0.9]. MAXδ represents the financial system’s maximum 
capacity to securitize. It functions as a ceiling on the sum of mortgages the banks can securitize within 
                                                          
10
 Empirical data from Statistics Iceland (statice.is). 
11
 Subsection 3.1. 
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the financial system. This parameter is set in order to avoid the model exploding and producing 
misleading results (see section 5 for an extended explanation). RoFIN represents the business 
decisions on how to use the mix of financial innovation tools, processes and services.  The numbers of 
RoFIN are chosen to design the simulation in a way to show the change in the financial operators’ 
securitization propensity. The higher this propensity, the higher the resort to the securitization 
process.  
 
ICEACE presents a parameter β, which is a fraction of a household’s total quarterly net income, given 
the income from labour and capital owned β(wL + wC). It sets the attitude of the banks towards 
lending. Thus, this parameter represents the banks' ability to evaluate household robustness to repay 
the mortgages granted. Unlike the original version of the ICEACE model, in which beta is a fixed pre-
established parameter, the HH budget constraint (beta) is now a variable and considered as a function 
of the securitization (β = f(S) with S = securitization process). More specifically, it is related to the 
financial system’s max securitization ratio (MAXδ) and the rate of financial innovation (RoFIN): 
 
β (t)=RoFIN(t) MAXδ (t)) 
 
The numbers used to obtain the different levels of beta have been set in a way to reproduce through 
the simulation what happened before and during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. They are also 
intended to analyse the range of stability and identify the ranges in which instability occurs.  
 
5  Simulation setting 
The setting agent variables in the ICEACE model simulated are: 8000 households, 125 firms, 25 
construction firms, 2 banks and 2 SPVs, 1 government and 1 central bank. To generate different 
stochastic processes, several random seeds have been run, in order to make the simulation of the 
model more in line with the real world and to obtain reliable results.  
 
ABE makes an intentionally extreme simplification of the securitization process, adapting it within 
the ICEACE model architecture. However, why do banks decide on securitization? The main reasons 
are asset risk reduction; reduction of regulatory capital requirements; the creation of new liquidity 
(not from deposits or the central bank) at a reduced price; and transformation of profits from interest 
income (by lending) in profits from commission income (by intermediation).  
 
The first step of the ABE was to implement the main ICEACE scripts in order to replicate the 
relationship between finance and the real economy (the list of the scripts implemented and the main 
script changes are available in Appendix 4).  
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Explaining the ABE exercise step by step (see Table 1), the securitization process is promoted directly 
by commercial banks (the Universal Bank Model is assumed), which are simultaneously the 
Originator and Servicer
12
. At the beginning of the process, each bank creates an SPV and the 
securitization balance sheet is initialized (see interaction scheme in Table 1 and codes in Appendix 4). 
Thus, each commercial bank chooses a non-fixed fraction of credits (only mortgages for the sake of 
simplicity) and brings them off-balance in order to transfer them to the securitization process and thus 
to the SPV balance sheet.  
 
     
                       
               
                         
 
In the original ICEACE model, the banks' income statements are computed without differentiation 
between loans and mortgages. In the incremental experiment with securitization, this differentiation is 
made because only the mortgages are securitized. In addition, the securitization ratio depends on the 
fund liquidity available; hence, the securitization demand might be rationed. The total assets of each 
bank will be reduced by the bank off-balance quantity (percentage of credit sent to the securitization 
process). Therefore, there will be an important impact on the calculation of the ‘capital adequacy 
ratio’ (      Equity(t)/Tot Credit Exposure(t)), which is the fraction of risk that a bank is allowed to 
take within a given time step, compared to its own liquidity. Hence, the capital required can be 
reduced to                (given that the amount           is the minimum capital required to 
be held on the balance sheet). 
 
The SPV transforms the credits into CMOs
13
 (      CMOs(t)) - Collateral Mortgages Obligation - 
and transfers/sells them to the Fund (EF). The securitization by the SPV is made at the beginning of 
each quarter. Simultaneously, at the beginning of each quarter banks choose the mortgages to 
securitize and the HH interest payments are also at this time. It is important to highlight that the SPV 
role is similar to a transformation platform, through which simply the mortgages off-balance pass 
through, becoming CMOs and being transferred to the Fund. Each bank complies with the parameter 
of the Max Securitization Ratio, which represents the financial system upper limit for securitization. 
The parameter of the max securitization ratio is used to set the securitization target which is needed 
for designing the demand side of the financial system for securitization. Therefore, having set a 
securitization target in the system each bank will establish the securitization ratio (the amount of 
mortgages to send to the securitization process). This parameter is adjusted in line with the fund 
                                                          
12 Originator in terms of mortgage origination by a financial institution (in this case the bank) and Servicer in terms of 
collecting monthly payments from borrowers and sending monthly payments to the Fund by the SPV. 
13 The pooling and packaging process. 
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liquidity available at a certain point in time. Thus, the securitization balance sheet is initialized. If the 
Fund does not have enough liquidity to satisfy the securitization demand, the banks cannot securitize. 
Therefore, there can be two cases: 1) the mortgages put off-balance to be transferred to the 
securitization process can be smaller than the securitization target; thus, the securitization demand 
rises; and 2) the mortgages put off-balance to be transferred to the securitization process can be 
greater than the securitization target; thus, the securitization demand is rationed (banks are rationed to 
create CMOs by mortgages off-balance if the Fund has a lack of liquidity). This mechanism is 
established in order to compensate for the fact that the model does not present a market for CMOs. 
The number of mortgages securitized in CMOs is always variable over time.  
 
CMOs are transferred/sold from the SPV to the Fund in exchange for ‘fresh’ liquidity, which is paid 
through the SPV to the banks. The Fund pays (transfers) to the commercial banks an amount equal
14
 
to the CMOs transferred. The banks receive the mortgage payments monthly, plus the interest from 
the HHs, and transfer them to the Fund, which uses the flow of mortgage payments plus interest on 
the CMO payments to investors. Banks, the SPV and Fund balance sheets are simultaneously updated. 
The reduction operated on the bank assets side of the credit exposure level gives the banks the 
possibility of taking a higher risk exposure within a given time step, rather than what would happen if 
we were in a bank operativity regime without the securitization process.  
 
Finally, the banks’ earnings are reduced by the proportion of mortgages securitized. When HHs make 
mortgage payments to the banks, the interest flows from the banks are diverted directly to the Fund 
through the SPVs (see Table 1). Therefore, Fund liquidity increases to the same extent as the 
proportion of mortgages securitized (mortgage repayments + interest flow). Banks keep the share of 
earnings from the mortgages that remain on the balance sheet. 
 
In summary, banks transfer a variable proportion of mortgages issued to the SPV, the SPV collects 
and transforms the mortgages (a pooling or packaging process) into CMOs and transfers these to the 
Fund, which receives the new CMOs and transfers liquidity to the banks through the SPV. Therefore, 
the banks have fresh liquidity on their balance sheets to make new mortgages and loans. Again, a 
percentage of the new credits issued by banks are sent to the securitization process, and so on and so 
forth. As a result of this mechanism the risk is pushed forward in the financial system. In this way, the 
commercial banks cannot only push forward risks, reducing the asset risk level (the risk of their 
mortgage loans not being repaid  by borrowers), but they can also collect new liquidity more easily at 
a reduced price in order to make new credits. This process behaves like a loop, repeating itself 
continuously until a shock intervenes to interrupt the cycle. 
                                                          
14 To simplify, it is usually a little lower than the nominal value. 
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A modelling gap exists with regard to the rigidity of the scheme implemented, given the will to keep 
the ABE as simple as possible at this stage of the research. In addition, the securitization at this time 
regards all mortgages equally, without setting any risk differentiation (separation between mortgages 
with varying degrees of risk of not being repaid).  
 
 
Table 1: Interaction Scheme of the AMB Exercise in ACEACE. 
 
Source: Author's elaboration 
 
5.1 Multi-leveraging 
Most of the macroeconomic models in the literature are designed with a representative commercial 
bank and as a consequence only one bank leverage (credits/deposits) is considered. However, in the 
real world there are multiple leverages operating in the financial system, given the OTD architecture 
established (e.g. see Tan et al. (2015) for an interesting discussion on arbitrage and leverage 
strategies). Therefore, in ABE a simplified version of this multi-leveraging effect is reproduced, 
setting two leverages rather than one:           
               
         
  represents the leverage at the 
commercial bank level.            
    
 
   
   
 , of which     is the value of the total credits 
transferred to the securitization process and    is the value of the bank equity, represents the 
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leverage operating at the investment bank level. While Leverage 1 is subject to regulation to assure 
that banks do not become excessively exposed, Leverage 2 is not and the commercial banks can use it 
to impact on their Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) and increase their profits. Introducing the multi-
leverage mechanism operating in the financial system is indispensable for understanding how 
systemic risk develops and how the financial operators extract more profits from their financial 
activities. Therefore, it is highly desirable for the future research agenda to investigate extensively the 
multi-leverage mechanism and the ensuing multi-multiplicator effect generated. 
 
5.2 The Bankruptcy Hypothesis 
The bankruptcy hypothesis occurs when mortgages are not repaid by borrowers (bad debts). When 
HHs are unable to repay their mortgages, the Fund does not receive mortgage principal repayments or 
interest flows, and consequently it registers a liquidity problem, because it becomes unable to transfer 
fresh liquidity to the banks. In turn, the banks register a liquidity crisis, which means they increase 
their solvency risk until they reach the bankruptcy level. Given the stock-flow control operating in the 
model, banks always need to balance their assets with their liabilities. When the value of the assets is 
less than the value of liabilities and the capital held is not enough to cover the losses, they will 
become insolvent.  
 
6 Analysis of the outcomes 
Figures 1-9 show the time series of single numerical simulation runs. In Figure 1a, the aggregate real 
GDP (sum of the real production of firms) is plotted. The dynamics of the real GDP are associated 
with the different levels of βs , given the rate of financial innovation [0.4, 0.5, 0.9] and the max 
securitization ratio, fixed at [0.5]. The black line corresponds to β = 0.2; with this value, banks look 
carefully at HHs’ capability to repay the loans before granting mortgages. The green line corresponds 
to β = 0.25 and the red line to β = 0.45. The red line, in contrast to the black one, shows the case 
where a high level of securitization, given the high rate of financial innovation, allows banks to loosen 
the credit trustworthiness conditions required to approve mortgages, increasing endogenously the 
level of βs . This is translated into a change in the mortgage amount issued (see also Figure 4).  
 
Attention here is focused on analysing how the increasing rate of financial innovation raises the use of 
securitization tools, eventually increasing the βs value. This process creates a lowering of risk 
perception because the level of uncertainty of repayment default by HHs has been cut drastically. 
When the value of beta is high, the crisis becomes realistic, and the whole economic system falls into 
deep recession. In Figure 1a, the red line shows that the economy reflects a higher real GDP growth 
rate in the first period around years 1-3 and the second period around years 4-6. However, at a certain 
point the economy starts to register a deep recession around years 6-7, with associated greater 
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volatility, which makes the economy become more fragile. On the contrary, the black line, although it 
is more stable, registers a low growth rate. The green line is an intermediate case.  
 
Running the real GDP plot for 15 periods (Figure 1b), it is possible to show clearly how the increasing 
rate of financial innovation in the financial system impacts on economic growth, anticipating the 
economic crisis and making it deeper. In fact, comparing the green line (beta 0.25) with the red one 
(beta 0.45), the simulation shows that the economic recession starts later in the case of the former and 
also the extent of the crises shows an appreciable difference. 
 
Figure 1: a) Real GDP 7 years 
 
 
b) Real GDP 15 years 
 
Source: Author's elaboration 
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In figures 2 and 3 it can be seen how a high rate of financial innovation increases the percentage of 
mortgages brought off-balance (δ) and introduced into the securitization process to be transformed 
into CMOs (see the red line, in particular, when β = 0.45). In figures 2 and 3 it can also be observed 
how whenever the banks shrink the level of mortgages given the occurrence of shocks, they do not 
reduce their level of leverage (neither leverages 1 nor 2) within the financial system when they reduce 
the level of lending. They restart their lending activity after confidence is restored in the economy and 
within the financial system at higher and higher leverage levels. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mortgages Off-Balance 
 
Source: Author's elaboration 
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Figure 3: CMOs Created and Transferred to the Fund 
 
Source: Author's elaboration 
 
Figure 4 presents an interesting result. It shows increasing aggregate HH debts, given the increase in 
mortgages issued by the banks (            ). This means that HHs have more money available 
to buy consumption goods and real estate. In addition, the mortgages issued reflect an increase in 
deposits. This confirms the assumption that the banks create deposits ex nihilo (Schumpeter, 1934; see 
also Ryan-Collins et al. (2011) for a clear explanation of this mechanism). If the agents (in this case 
HHs) in the economy choose to increase their liabilities, the banks are able to increase the size of their 
assets first. Only consequently will the banks register an increase on the liabilities side (deposits) and 
not vice versa (see Figure 6). Therefore, it can be seen that when banks are confident in themselves 
and in the market, they will create new bank money by the credit process and then new deposits for 
borrowers. If the level of confidence decreases, given the increase in the level of uncertainty, the 
banks will cut lending, limiting the creation of bank money. If confidence falls (as happened in the 
unprecedented situation in 2007-9), then banking system bankruptcy can involve the whole economic 
system (the contagion effect; see Kaufman, 1994). The plot of real GDP (Figures 1a-1b) and the HH 
mortgages (Figure 4) shows an initial lack of confidence around periods 3-4 (red line), which could be 
linked (as a connection with reality) to the ICT “New Economy” bubble around 2000 or, more 
realistically, with the first signals coming from the UK real estate bubble around 2004. A tolerable 
reduction in the confidence level creates a temporary contraction in the lending process. When 
confidence is restored, the lending process restarts and, as seen in Figure 4, it grows faster than in the 
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previous period. Figure 5 simply shows the sum of HH mortgages and firms loans, presenting a 
clearer picture of the debt accumulation dynamics in the economy. 
 
Figure 7 shows the impact of securitization, given the different rate of financial innovation, on the 
calculation of the ‘capital adequacy ratio’ for the two banks in the model. Both clearly show the 
tendency to reduce the CAR ratio and how they can easily do this using the highly-technologically 
advanced financial innovation tools. Around periods 3-4 and 6-7 it can be seen (from the red line) that 
the banks try to restore an adequate level of CAR when shocks occur, but eventually, when the 
financial system has registered a collapse as a whole, they have serious problems in satisfying the 
capital ratio required. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Household Mortgages granted 
 
Source: Author's elaboration 
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Figure 5: Household Mortgages plus Firm Loans 
 
Source: Author's elaboration 
 
Figure 6: Deposits 
 
Source: Author's elaboration 
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Figure 7: CAR Banks 1 and 2  
 
a) Bank 1 Capital Adequacy Ratio Analysis. 
 
 
b) Bank 2 Capital Adequacy Ratio Analysis. 
Source: Author's elaboration 
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With regard to the central bank assets
15
 (Figure 8), while the black and green lines have a similar path, 
it is possible to observe from the red line that the banks have the tendency to reduce central bank debt 
because financial innovation helps them to find new liquidity at a cheaper price. In normal times, 
thanks to financial innovation, banks can diversify the liquidity collected, reducing the demand for 
funds by the central bank. Usually, in the presence of low levels of financial innovation, during 
financial and especially banking crises, banks' demand for central bank liquidity may sharply increase 
to compensate for declines in other forms of bank liabilities, often resulting from withdrawals of bank 
deposits (see the green line). However, the demand for central bank liquidity does not work in the red 
line, where the deleveraging mechanism by the central bank seems to operate. The central bank in 
periods 4-5 and later in 6.5-7.5 makes a reduction in central bank assets. In fact, it reduces leveraging 
to shrink assets faster than equities, which are already falling. This is what happened before and after 
the financial crisis: the shift from the North Atlantic liquidity squeeze (Mullineux, 2008) to a solvency 
crisis (i.e. Lehman Brothers - Buckley, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 8: Central Bank Assets 
 
Source: Author's elaboration 
 
                                                          
15 Credits granted to commercial banks by the Central Bank. 
 
22 
 
A higher level of liquidity has a wealth effect. On one hand, both lead to a building up of demand for 
goods, which in turn leads to higher consumption. On the other hand, if HHs cannot continue to pay 
the interest on the mortgages taken out, a liquidity squeeze takes effect; the price dynamics will reflect 
the events of the inflated flow of credit/bank money in the economic system, building up bubbles. At 
the end of the chain of events, the result is a severe solvency crisis, which impacts on growth (as seen 
in Figures 1a and 1b) and unemployment (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9: Unemployment (% Rate) 
 
Source: Author's elaboration 
 
However, at this stage of the experimentation, the ‘structural change’ is not considered in the model 
implementation, which is an important gap to resolve. In fact, if the model is run at 15 years a GDP is 
obtained which is not a close-fitting representation of the real business cycle, in particular after the 
crises occurred. A structural change will shift the parameters of a certain entity, which can be 
represented by significant changes in numerical data. This means that the model needs to be adapted 
to the new economic conditions. However, real GDP compared with the real data (see the plot in 
Appendix 5) shows that the long economic recovery after the severe crisis seems to be realistic and in 
line with reality, even though it is too linear. Moreover, the structural change effect could be 
considered as a relevant effect of the introduction of financial innovation in the ICEACE economy. 
Indeed, financial innovation has the property to modify the economic variables radically; in fact, this 
kind of problem is not found in the business cycle presented by Erlingsson et al. (2014).  
 
6.1 Statistics 
For the sake of clarity and completeness of the simulation section, Table 2 shows the aggregate 
average values of the real variables (Real GDP, Unemployment and Government Deficit); the 
financial variables (Deposits, Total Mortgages, Tot Mortgages transferred to the securitization 
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process, central bank assets and central bank rate); and three important ratios (the securitization ratio, 
first level of financial leverage and second level of financial leverage). The average values have been 
computed for 30 and 60 quarters, considering 40 different random simulation seeds, and provide full 
support to the single numerical simulation run (see Figures 1-9). From the average values, the impact 
of the securitization process and the rate of financial innovation (different level of RoFIN) on the real 
economy (see values for Real GDP, Unemployment and Government Deficit) emerge clearly. The 
financial variables also register interesting dynamics, confirming the endogenous money/credit 
creation (ex nihilo) mechanism, when in particular there is an enlargement of the securitization ratio 
given the increasing level of RoFIN (see the level of deposits). Leverage 1 increases at different levels 
of beta and leverage 2 rises drastically when RoFIN = 0.9. Finally, the table presents interesting 
results that highlight the different impact of the securitization process, given the different levels of 
RoFIN, whether we are analysing the short or long run (i.e. see the number of total mortgages, 
mortgages off-balance, securitization ratio, and leverage 2).  
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Table 2: Aggregate values (on average) for the three different levels of β. 
 
 Quarters 
β = 0.2 
(with RoFIN= 0.4) 
β = 0.25 
(with RoFIN= 0.5) 
β = 0.45 
(with RoFIN= 0.9) 
Real GDP 
60 
 
30 
34,344.0 
 
38,420.00 
34,701.34 
 
39,943.66 
30,503.92 
 
34,224.96 
Unemployment 
 
60 
 
30 
1,407.26 
 
1,583.87 
1,497.12 
 
1,486.94 
2,298.51 
 
2,396.311 
Government 
Deficit 
60 
 
30 
-7,898.64 
 
-59,697.72 
-56,034.13 
 
-25,703.70 
-56,4222.30 
 
-55,996.14 
Deposits 
60 
 
30 
97,679.15 
 
73,021.52 
217,892.7 
 
117,998.1 
400.919.0 
 
370,128.3 
Total Mortgages 
60 
 
30 
995,335.4 
 
965,301.4 
384,703.0 
 
1,093,614.00 
547,821.1 
 
1,191,190.0 
Mortgages Off-
Balance 
60 
 
30 
200,831.4 
 
199,756.9 
100,759.3 
 
277,214.0 
241,293.4 
 
537,711.2 
Securitization 
Ratio 
60 
 
30 
0.2018 
 
0.2096 
0.2676 
 
0.2541 
0.5803 
 
0.45 
Central Bank 
Assets 
60 
 
30 
0.19035 
 
0.1449 
-0.9013 
 
0.1396 
0.1234 
 
0.03094 
Central Bank 
Rate 
60 
 
30 
0.005 
 
0.005 
0.005 
 
0.005 
0.1058 
 
0.005 
Leverage 1 
(deposits/tot 
mortgages) 
60 
 
30 
0.09813 
 
0.07564 
0.5663 
 
0.10789 
0.7318 
 
0.3107 
Leverage 2  
(mort. off 
balance/bank 
equity) 
60 
 
30 
1.0681 
 
1.4272 
-0.2909 
 
1.8256 
3.5919 
 
15.2881 
 
Source: Author's elaboration 
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7 Conclusions 
The research conducted in this paper shows the existence of what we call the virtuous and unvirtuous 
cycles (see section 2). The dynamics of the two cycles are characterized by non-linear causality 
interactions, which are influenced by securitization, given the different rate of financial innovation at 
any time, and by the structural leveraging subdivisions (the OTD model, Originate-To-Distribute) 
among the agents who are involved in the financial system. An ABM (Agent-Based Model) exercise 
(ABE) has been conducted in order to analyse the role of financial innovation and the concentration of 
financial power (which promotes the creation of an unvirtuous cycle).  The experiment makes an 
intentionally extreme simplification of the financial industry. It does not differentiate risk among the 
different types of assets; there is neither an interbank nor derivative market; and in the securitization 
process only mortgages are processed and no other types of loans (e.g. credit cards).  These are 
important limitations to overcome, which will be the object of study in the future research agenda. 
However, given the focus of the paper of understanding what makes finance good or bad, and how 
this impacts on the business cycle path, ABE undoubtedly provides us with first evidence about the 
unvirtuous cycle and of the role played by the securitization process, led by the change in the rate of 
financial innovation, which amplifies the endogenous money/credit creation ability of the financial 
operators. The rate of financial innovation and the securitization process are implemented within the 
ICEACE model (Erlingsson et al., 2014), showing political economy dynamics with non-linearity. 
The experiment shows how the different rates of financial innovation, through the use of 
securitization, modify the ability of the financial system to shift risk forward from one financial agent 
to another in the name of so-called “diversification” strategies (Markowitz, 1959). This drastically 
reduces the perception of risk and uncertainty, within both the financial and economic systems and, as 
a result, the financial operators misprice risky assets and increase their exposures; in particular, when 
the rate of financial innovation exceeds the threshold of 50% (see section 6).  
 
With ABE, three main aspects have emerged that have important implications in terms of future 
policy analysis and macroeconomic research.  
1) The role of financial innovation in fostering the development of a highly technological 
financial system characterized by complex and unintelligible instruments and products and 
unrecognizable from its original banking business purposes (the passage from the OTH to the 
OTD financial structure model). However, financial innovation cannot be blamed in itself for 
being good or bad. The discussion about good and bad finance (Zingales, 2015) is strictly 
linked to the business decisions that the financial agents take (financial innovation 
development), which is mirrored by the parameter in ABE identified as the rate of financial 
innovation. The individuation of RoFIN is crucial because RoFIN can create positive or 
negative externalities, producing amplified positive or negative financial effects that can 
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impact on the business cycle. The next step of the present research will be to investigate 
RoFIN further as a variable, rather than as a simple parameter. 
2) The multi-leverage mechanism present within the financial system, which triggered what we 
call a multi-multiplier effect, namely the ability of financial agents to split the financial 
supply chain into more levels of activity, applying at each level a leverage that in ABE has 
been reproduced in a simplified version, introducing only two levels of leverage (Leverages 1 
and 2). The presence of multi-leverages in the financial system greatly increases the quantity 
of money/credit created endogenously in the economic system. However, little is still really 
known about its mode of operation and impact on financial instability. To identify, isolate and 
study the single levels of  leverage operating within the financial system is part of the future 
research plan. 
3) Last but not least, the creation of regulatory black holes owing to highly interconnected and 
complex financial structures (regulatory dialectic; Kane, 1977). Investigation into how to 
contain their distortive effects is vital to avoid the business cycle switching from a virtuous to 
an unvirtuous cycle over time.  
 
Furthermore, the above-listed points highlight the need to investigate alternative policies when the 
finance-growth nexus governs the economy. The problem is structural, and the policies implemented 
until now (such as the low interest rate regime and quantitative easing, among others) have 
demonstrated that they are unable to identify and resolve the structural factors which make 
monopolistic financial power concentration possible (Blundell-Wignall and Roulet, 2013). A mix of 
regulatory, macroprudential and structural proposals needs to be studied and developed carefully by 
scholars and decision-makers to bring the economy back to the virtuous cycle and to create a certain 
level of financial stability based on “social utility” rather than “rent-seeking maximization”, which 
should prevent the virtuous cycle from becoming a bad one again.  
 
References 
 
Allen, F. and Carletti, E. (2006). Credit Risk Transfer and Contagion. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, vol. 53 (1), 89-111. 
Amore, M., Schneider, C. and Zaldokas, A. (2013). Credit Supply and Corporate Innovation. 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 109(3), 835-855. 
27 
 
Beck, T., Chen, T., Lin, C. and Song, F. M. (2016). Financial Innovation: the Bright and the Dark 
Sides. Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 72, 28-51. 
Bencivenga, V. and Smith, B. (1991). Financial Intermediation and Endogenous Growth. Review of 
Economics Studies, vol. 58, 195-209. 
Berndt, A. and Gupta, A. (2009). Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the Originate-To-
Distribute Model of Bank Credit. Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 56(5), 725-743. 
Bezemer, D. J. (2011). The Credit Crisis and Recession as a Paradigm Test. Journal of Economic 
Issues, vol. 45(1), 1-18. 
Bezemer, D. J. (2012). The Economy as a Complex System: the Balance Sheet Dimension.  
Advances in Complex Systems, vol. 15 (5), 1-22 (1250047).  
Blundell-Wignall, A. and Roulet, C. (2013). Bank Business Models, Capital Rules and Structural 
Separation Policies: an Evidence-Based Critique of Current Policy Trends. Journal of Financial 
Economic Policy, vol. 5(4), 339-360. 
Bord, V. and Santos, J. A. (2012). The Rise of the Originate-To-Distribute Model and the Role of 
Banks in Financial Intermediation. Economic Policy Review, vol. 18(2), 21-34. 
Brunnermeier, M. K. and Sannikov, Y. (2014). A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector. 
The American Economic Review, vol. 104(2), 379-421. 
Buckley, A. (2011). Financial Crisis: Causes, Context And Consequences.  Harlow: Pearson 
Financial Times/Prentice Hall. 
Carroll, C. D., Otsuka, M. and Slacalek, J. (2011). How Large Are Housing and Financial Wealth 
Effects? A New Approach. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 43, 55-79. 
Case, K., Quigley, J. and Shiller, R. (2005). Comparing Wealth Effects: the Stock Market Versus 
the Housing Market. The BE Journal of Macroeconomics, vol. 5(1), 1. 
28 
 
Christensen, C.M. and Raynor, M.E. (2003). The Innovator's Solution: Creating and Sustaining 
Successful Growth. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Cincotti, S., Raberto, M. and Teglio, A. (2010). Credit money and macroeconomic instability in the 
agent-based model and simulator eurace. The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, vol. 
4(26), 1-32. 
Cincotti, S., Raberto, M. and Teglio, A. (2012). Macroprudential Policies in an Agent-Based 
Artificial Economy. Revue de l'OFCE, vol. 124 (5), 205-234.  
Colander, D., Howitt, P., Kirman, A. P., Leijonhufvud, A. and Mehrling, P. (2008). Beyond DSGE 
Models:Toward an Empirically Based Macroeconomics. American Economic Review, vol. 98, 
236-240. 
Creel, J., Hubert, P. and Labondance, F. (2015). Financial Stability and Economic Performance. 
Economic Modelling, vol. 48, 25-40. 
Dell’Ariccia, G., Igan, D. and Laeven, L. (2012). Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence 
from the Subprime Mortgage Market. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 44 (3), 367-
384. 
Dosi, G., Fagiolo, G., Napoletano, M. and Roventini, A. (2013). Income Distribution, Credit and 
Fiscal Policies in an Agent-Based Keynesian Model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, vol. 37(8), 1598-1625.  
Dosi, G., Fagiolo, G., Napoletano, M., Roventini, A. and Treibich, T. (2015).  Fiscal and Monetary 
Policies in Complex Evolving Economies. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 
52, 166-189.  
Erlingsson, E. J., Teglio, A., Cincotti, S., Stefansson, H., Sturluson, J. T. and Raberto, M. (2014). 
Housing Market Bubbles and Business Cycles in an Agent-Based Credit Economy. Economics: 
29 
 
The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW),  
vol. 8(8), 1-42. 
Greenwood, J. and Jovanovic, B. (1990). Financial Development, Growth, and the Distribution of 
Income. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, 1076-1107. 
Greenwood, J., Sanchez, J. M. and Wang, C. (2010). Financial Development: the Role of 
Information Costs. American Economic Review, vol. 100, 1875-1891. 
Grydaki, M. and Bezemer, D. (2013). The Role of Credit in the Great Moderation: a Multivariate 
GARCH Approach. Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 37(11), 4615-4626. 
Jakab, Z. and Kumhof, M. (2015). Banks are not Intermediaries of Loanable Funds - and Why This 
Matters. Bank of England, Working Paper, No. 529. 
Kane, E. J. (1977). Good Intentions and Unintended Evil: the Case Against Selective Credit 
Allocation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 9(1), part 1, 55-69. 
Kaufman, G. G. (1994). Bank Contagion: a Review of the Theory and Evidence. Journal of 
Financial Services Research, vol. 8, 123-150. 
Keen, S. (2011). Debunking Macroeconomics. Economic Analysis and Policy, vol. 41(3), 147-167. 
Keys, B., Mukherjee, T., Seru, A. and Vig, V. (2010). Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? 
Evidence from Subprime Loans. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 125 (1), 307-362. 
King, R. and Levine, R. (1993). Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth: Theory and Evidence. 
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 32, 513-542. 
Kirman, A. P. (2010). The Economic Crisis is a Crisis for Economic Theory. CESifo Economic 
Studies, vol. 56, 498-535. 
30 
 
Klein, M. W. and Olivei, G. P. (2008). Capital Account Liberalization, Financial Depth, and 
Economic Growth. Journal of International Money and Finance, vol. 27(6), 861-875. 
Koo, R. C. (2014). The Escape from Balance Sheet Recession and the QE Trap: a Hazardous Road 
for the World Economy. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons. 
Laeven, L., Levine, R. and Michalopoulos, S. (2015). Financial Innovation and Endogenous 
Growth. Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 24(1), 1-24. 
LeBaron, B. and Tesfatsion, L. (2008). Modeling Macroeconomies as Open-Ended Dynamic 
Systems of Interacting Agents. American Economic Review, vol. 98, 246-250. 
Lerner, J. and Tufano, P. (2011). The Consequences of Financial Innovation: a Counterfactual 
Research Agenda. Annual Review of Financial Economics, vol. 3, 41-85. 
Levine, R. (1997). Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda. Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 35(2), 688-726. 
Levine, R. (2005). Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence. In: Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S. N. 
(eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth (vol. 1, Chp. 12, pp. 865–934). Amsterdam: Elsevier, 
North Holland Publishing Co. 
Mallick, S.K., and R.M. Sousa (2013). The Real Effects of Financial Stress in the Eurozone. 
International Review of Financial Analysis, vol. 30, 1-17. 
Markowitz, H. (1959). Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Mian, A. and Sufi, M. (2009). The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from 
the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 124 (4), 1149-1496. 
Minsky, H. P. (1986). Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
31 
 
Mullineux, A. W. (2008). Lessons from Northern Rock and the North Atlantic Liquidity Squeeze. 
Melbourne Review: A Journal of Business and Public Policy, vol. 4(1), 7-12. 
Mullineux, A. W. (2010). Financial Innovation and Social Welfare. Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance, vol. 18(3), 243-256.  
Nguyen, D. K. (2014). Overview of the special issue on “Rethinking Risks in International 
Financial Markets: Modeling Tools and Applications.” Economic Modelling, vol. 40, 367-368. 
Palley, T. I. (2011). A Theory of Minsky Super-Cycles and Financial Crises. Contributions to 
Political Economy, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(1), 31-46. 
Raberto, M., Teglio, A. and Cincotti, S. (2012). Debt Deleveraging and Business Cycles. An 
Agent-Based Perspective. Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel 
Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 6(27), 1-49.  
Riccetti, L., Russo, A. and Gallegati, M. (2016). Financialisation and Crisis in an Agent Based 
Macroeconomic Model. Economic Modelling, vol. 52, 162-172. 
Rogers, E. M. (2003). Diffusion of Innovations. New York: Free Press. 
Romer, P. (2016). The Trouble with Macroeconomics. Forthcoming in The American Economist, 
https://paulromer.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/WP-Trouble.pdf.  
Rousseau, P. L. (1998). The Permanent Effects of Innovation on Financial Depth: Theory and US 
Historical Evidence from Unobservable Components Models. Journal of Monetary Economics, 
vol. 42, 387-425. 
Ryan-Collins, J., Greenham, T., Werner, R. and Jackson, A. (2011). Where Does Money Come 
From? A Guide to the UK Monetary and Banking System. London: New Economics 
Foundation. 
32 
 
Scannella, E. (2011). Innovazione Finanziaria e Instabilitа: il Trasferimento del Rischio di Credito., 
Studi e Note di Economia, Gruppo Montepaschi, vol. 16 (3), 339-382. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.  
Sinkey, J.F. (1992). Innovation as a Diffusion Process: Bank Technological Innovation, the 
Payments System and Information Processing. The Financial Services Industry, 4th ed., New 
York:  MacMillan. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2010).  Risk and Global Economic Architecture: Why Full Financial Integration May 
Be Undesirable. American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), 
388-392. 
Tan, S., Jin, Z. and Wu, F. (2015). Arbitrage and Leverage Strategies in Bubbles Under 
Synchronization Risks and Noise-Trader Risks. Economic Modelling, vol. 49, 331-343. 
Teglio, A., Raberto, M. and Cincotti, S. (2010). Balance Sheet Approach to Agent-Based 
Computational Economics: the Eurace Project. In Borgelt, C., González-Rodríguez, G., 
Trutschnig, W., Lubiano, M. A., Ángeles Gil M., Grzegorzewski, P. and Hryniewicz, O. (eds.) 
Combining Soft Computing and Statistical Methods in Data Analysis (pp. 603-610). 
Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer. 
Tesfatsion, L. and Judd, K (2006). Handbook of Computational Economics II: Agent-Based 
Computational Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier, North Holland Publishing Co. 
Tovar C. (2009). DSGE Models and Central Banks. Economics: The Open-Access, Open-
Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 3(16), 1-31. 
Verspagen, B. (2004). Innovation and Economic Growth. In Fagerberg, J., Mowery, D.C. and 
Nelson, R. R. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Innovation (Sec. IV, Chp. 18, pp. 487-513). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
33 
 
Walras, L. (1874, 1877). Éléments d’économie politique pure ou théorie de la richesse sociale. 
Definitive edn, Lausanne: Corbaz. Trans. W. Jaffé, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1954.  
Zingales, L. (2015). Presidential Address: Does Finance Benefit Society? The Journal of Finance, 
America Finance Association, 70(4), 1327-1363. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Appendix 1 
Brief introduction to the main components of the ICEACE model 
This appendix aims to summarise the main components of the ICEACE model setup (see Erlingsson et al., 2014 for a more extended and 
detailed explanation) which are essential to understanding the ABE. ICEACE is a macro agent-based model (ABM) which studies the effect 
of a housing market boom and bust on the real economy. The model presents an economy constituted by four markets: the housing market, 
labour market, consumption goods market and the credit market. The agents operating in this economy are households, firms, construction 
firms, banks, an equity fund, the government, and a central bank.  
Firms (Fs) and Construction Firms (CFs) 
Fs (producing consumption goods) and CFs (producing housing units) are modelled according to a Leontief production function with two 
inputs, labour L and capital K. 
F:              
     
     (1) 
CF:            
     
     (2) 
where    and   represent the productivity of labour and    and    represent the productivity of capital.   and s are respectively the indices 
of Fs and CFs. 
Fs model setting: 
1) Neither depreciation nor investments. Capital is constant and       for any F. 
2) Endowment of physical capital is initialized to a specific amount (fixed capital price    applies). 
3) Production takes place the last day of any month and is available for sale from the first day of the following month. 
4) Fs’ sales expectations    are set equally for the present and following month and depend on the previous month’s sales, unless in 
the previous month all the inventories    were sold out. If this is the case, expected sales are set equal to an amount of 10% 
higher than sales in the previous month. 
5) Fs’ production plans    for the present month are set at the beginning of each month. This takes into account a weighted average 
between previous production    and the supposed optimal plan,        , to avoid possible unrealistic and too wide oscillations 
of output. 
                                (3) 
where                    represents the best production plan. 
6) Fs’ labour demand is also set at the beginning of each month and given the production plan in the present month Fs compute the 
labour demand   
 
 as: 
  
  
  
  
     (4) 
Fs decide to hire or fire employees by computing the difference between labour demand   
 
 and the present labour endowment 
  . 
7) Unit production costs (from the previous monthly period) are computed as follows: 
   
        
 
  
    (5) 
where    represents the labour costs,    
 is the cost for the debt service that Fs pay to the banking sector with an    (nominal 
loan rate) calculated as a 1% spread on the Central Bank rate    , and  
   represents the debts that each F has with banks. 
The new average production costs     are also computed, taking into account the average production costs    
 
of Fs’ inventories 
  : 
    
   
 
       
     
     (6) 
8) Fs set prices (monthly) equal to the average unit production costs plus a fixed mark-up,   (fixed over time and across Fs).  
           
 
    (7) 
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CFs model setting: 
1) In order to control the growth of housing units in the model, CFs’ production is constrained to an initial endowment of physical 
capital        (they cannot invest in new physical capital). 
2) CFs take twelve months to produce each housing unit. They can face two possible issues: a) being rationed in the labour market 
or b) being rationed in the credit market. 
3) CFs’ production plan is driven by short-term profits and is influenced by housing market prices. Therefore, construction firms 
build more houses (randomly chosen and uniformly distributed in the interval        
  )16 if the price increases (      ) and 
reduce the production of houses (randomly chosen and again uniformly distributed in the interval       ) if the price decreases. 
4) CFs, in a similar way to Fs, set their labour demand according to their production plans. 
  
  
   
    
    (8) 
5) There is competition between new housing units and old housing units put up for sale in the housing market. 
Households (HHs) 
1) HHs provide a homogeneous labour force to firms and construction firms. 
2) The labour income   
 consists of wages  , unemployment benefits    
  and general benefits    
 . Therefore, 
  
        
     
     (9) 
3) Consumption is modelled according to the theory of buffer-stock saving behaviour (Carroll, 2001; Deaton, 1992).17 Moreover, 
the wealth effect on consumption is taken into account. Therefore, the HHs’ consumption budget   
  is set at the beginning of 
each month as a combination between the buffer-stock theory of saving and the wealth effect. 
  
         
     
         (10) 
where    is the disposable income after tax18,    sets a consumption budget speed adjustment,  
 is the HHs’ liquidity,    
represents a target level according to the buffer-stock theory, the parameter   sets the size of the wealth effect on consumption 
and    is the HHs’ equity or net wealth.19 
4) The consumption market opens on the first day of every week. HHs are randomly queued into it and they spend a fraction of their 
consumption budget saved from the previous week. HHs randomly select consumption goods firms that offer the lower prices. 
The consumption market closes when goods for sale run out or HHs have spent their entire weekly budget. 
5) HHs buy houses built by CFs. HHs who are selected with probability    can enter the housing market as buyers or sellers with 
equal likelihood. 
6) HHs in financial distress will be constricted to selling a housing unit if the following condition applies:  
        
          
           (11) 
where    is the HHs’ past quarterly mortgage costs (interest + principal payments),   is a fraction of their total past quarterly net 
income (a parameter defined in the interval (0, 1)),     
  and   
  represent respectively labour income and capital income, while    
and    represent respectively labour tax income and capital tax income. 
Banks (Bs) 
1) Bs collect private sector deposits from HHs, Fs and CFs. 
2) Bs supply loans to Fs and CFs, and mortgages to HHs. Each B must respect the minimum capital requirement      where 
  represents the bank equity of each bank b and   is a fraction of the B’s total risky assets.  
Producers: 
                                                          
16
 Where    is the current number of projects under construction and    
  is the maximum production capacity of construction firm s. 
17 Carroll, C. D. (2001). A theory of the consumption function, with and without liquidity constraints. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(3): 23-45. 
Deaton, A. (1992). Household saving in LDCs: Credit markets, insurance and welfare. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94(2): 253-273. 
18 Income tax    and capital tax    applies 
19    is the result of the dynamics of housing prices. 
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3) Fs and CFs receive a loan only if they have positive equity. HHs are provided with a mortgage only if they respect a minimum 
equity ratio requirement of     , where    represents their net wealth and   is a fraction of each HH h total wealth    
  
      
 , where    
  (housing price times housing units) is the housing wealth,    is the HH liquidity and    
  is the 
equity fund shares. 
4) Each quarter Fs and CFs can access the loan market and their demand for loans   
     
is set as follows: 
  
             
                           (12) 
where    
      is the interest payment on loans,          denotes the dividends and       is the liquidity of Fs and CFs. They apply 
for credit first from their preferred bank, randomly set at the beginning of the simulation. If they are rationed by the first bank 
they apply to a second randomly selected bank.  
5) Fs and CFs can apply for financing from the EF if the loan obtained from the second bank is insufficient to cover the interest 
payment on loans. The minimum equity ratio for being accepted for financing by the EF is 5%. If producers have a ratio lower 
than this, they cannot access the EF and will face illiquidity bankruptcy. This results in a loss for the banking system and an 
increase in unemployment.  
6) An entry and exit mechanism for Fs and CFs operates. Both illiquidity and insolvency bankruptcy of producers entails that the 
number of producers is constant over time. 
Households: 
1) HHs who wish to purchase a new housing unit and do not have enough liquidity to do so apply for a mortgage from the Bs. Each 
HH has its preferred bank. However, if HHs are credit rationed by the preferred bank, they do not apply for credit from a 
different bank (unlike producers). 
2) The model assumes an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) lasting for 40 years. The changes in the financing conditions of the 
economy are mirrored by the changes in the annual mortgage rate   . 
3) The mortgage rate changes quarterly and depends on changes in the CB interest rate     plus a fixed 2% spread. There is no cap 
on interest rate or payment variation between quarters. 
4) The annuity factor of each mortgage is given by: 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
   
     (13) 
where n is the remaining number of quarters before the mortgage contract ends. 
5) The quarterly mortgage costs    are given by: 
   
  
  
      (14) 
where    is the principal amount remaining to repay the mortgage m. Mortgage costs take into account the quarterly interest 
payment computed as   
    
 
 
   and part of the principal repaid computed as   
       
 . 
6) In order to obtain a new mortgage, HHs need to demonstrate to the Bs their ability to repay the flow of interests plus the principal 
of their portfolio of mortgages (composed by old and new mortgages) given their present income and the present mortgage rate. 
7) The HHs’ budget constrained in obtaining a new mortgages m* is set by the following condition: 
      
                         (15) 
 
where      represents the sum total of the quarterly costs of present mortgages,  
   denotes the additional quarterly costs 
related to the new requested mortgage, and   is a fraction of the total quarterly net income, which includes both labour    and 
capital income   . 
8) If HHs sell housing units, they use the amount received to pay back the entire mortgage and keep the remaining part of the 
amount (if any) as liquidity. 
9) If the ability of HHs to service their debts is unsustainable             
          
        , the Bs write-off these debts. 
As a consequence, the banks register a loss equal to the total debt write-off on the balance sheet (assets side). 
Government (G) 
1) The G manages fiscal policy in the economy. It collects taxes on both labour   and capital income   and it pays both general 
   and unemployment     benefits to HHs. 
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2) The G pursues a zero deficit policy by balancing tax and benefits. The parameter  , defined in the interval (0,1), sets the ratio 
between the use of taxes and benefits to balance the budget of the G. 
 
Central Bank (CB) 
1) The CB sets the monetary policy and the policy rate     monthly, according to a Taylor rule, 
      
 
 
        
 
 
      (16) 
where   is the unemployment rate,  is the inflation rate and    is the inflation target of the Central Bank. 
2) The minimum interest rate is set at 0.5% 
3) The CB provides banks with lending and deposit facilities and grants loans to the government if needed. 
Equity Fund (EF) 
1) The EF owns all the equity shares of Fs, CFs and Bs, collects their dividends and redistributes them to HHs. 
2) The share of the EF is equally distributed among HHs. 
3) If Fs and CFs are in need of financing or have been credit rationed, the EF can decide to retain part of the dividends received and 
provide them with financing. 
The Housing Market (HM) 
1) The HM is a posted-price market. Sellers post prices and buyers search for the cheapest one. 
2) Sellers i (HHs and CFs) set their prices based on the current market price    (average transaction price from the previous 
monthly period). In this first case, sellers’ selling decisions are not bound by financial needs. They sell the housing unit only if 
they can maximise the gain over the market price: 
  
        
    with                                      (17) 
where    is a random draw by seller i from a uniform distribution defined in the interval between 0 and   
   .  
3) In the second scenario, sellers’ selling decisions are bound by financial needs (in particular, the focus here is on HHs who are in 
financial distress). Therefore, they agree to sell the housing unit at a lower price than the market price. 
  
 
       
    with                                      (18) 
where    is a random draw by household h from a uniform distribution defined in the interval between 0 and   
        . 
4) Buyers (HHs) are randomly queued into the HM. They will buy the cheapest housing unit available. The transactions are 
completed if the HHs have the necessary financial resources or are able to obtain a mortgage from the Bs. 
5) The HM closes when all buyers have had their chance to buy a housing unit or the supply of housing is depleted. Therefore a new 
housing price    is calculated as an average of the realized transaction prices. 
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Appendix 2 
Table 3: Table of initial values in the ICEACE model by Erlingsson et al. (2014)  
 
Source: Erlingsson et al. (2014). 
NOTE: for a description of all the variables that are not explained here, see Erlingsson et 
al.'s 2014 paper. 
 
Table 4: Table of the additional financial innovation parameters 
 
Source: Author's elaboration. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Table 5: Table of general parameters in the ICEACE model by Erlingsson et al. (2014) 
 
Source: Erlingsson et al. (2014). 
NOTE: for a description of all the variables that are not explained here see Erlingsson et al.'s 
2014 paper. 
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Appendix 4: New and Incremented ICEACE Scripts  
 
1. Banks_securitization (completely new) 
2. Banks_initialization (increment in the assets and liability side of the banks' balance sheet 
initialization, given the presence of the securitization process ) 
3. Households_repay_mortgage_to_banks (increment relating to banks and the fund 
securitization account update) 
4. Fund_initialization (increment in the assets and liability side of the Fund's balance sheet 
initialization, given the presence of the securitization process) 
5. Banks_pay_securitization_claims_to_Fund (the securitization flows of interests and principal 
are transferred to be collected by the Fund)  
6. Fund_compute_balance_sheet  
7. Banks_compute_balance_sheet  
8. ICEACE_multilple_run  
9. ICEACE_gathering_data_multiple  
10. ICEACE_inizialization_multiple  
11. ICEACE_plotting_multiple  
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I) Banks initialization 
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II) Banks securitization 
 
III) Capital Fund initialization 
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IV) Banks and Capital Fund compute balance sheet 
 
V) Banks pay securitization claims to Capital Fund 
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VI) Households repay mortgages to banks 
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Appendix 5  
 
Source: Trading Economics (2014) 
